Congress Could Take Back Trump’s Tariff Powers. Here’s How.

No president should have this much power over economic policy.

I am a regular contributor to Barrons.com. The post below originally appeared there on 3.9.2025.

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Congress isn’t supposed to be a bystander in setting U.S. trade policy. But over the last several decades, that is exactly what it has become. The legislature is ceding its constitutional authority to the executive branch in the name of expedience and political convenience.

That long slide of abdication hit a dangerous milestone last week when President Donald Trump unilaterally delivered one of the most sweeping changes to U.S. trade policy in modern history: a new tariff regime consisting of a 10% baseline tariff on virtually all imports and additional double-digit “reciprocal” tariffs on countries that have large U.S. trade deficits.

How We Got Here

The Constitution explicitly vests Congress with the power to “lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises.” For much of U.S. history, lawmakers guarded that power closely. Tariff debates over import duties shaping elections, regional alliances, and economic policy dominated the halls of Congress for much of the 19th century.

But, beginning in the 20th century, Congress began delegating its trade authority to the executive branch, largely in pursuit of efficiency and flexibility in global negotiations. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 allowed the president to reduce tariffs within preapproved limits. Later, the Trade Expansion Act of 1962—particularly Section 232—authorized presidents to adjust imports if they threatened national security. Then came the Trade Act of 1974. That law lays out Section 301, an important bit of legislation that grants the president the power to place tariffs on countries his administration says engages in unfair trade practices.

These delegations were meant to streamline trade agreements and give the president the tools to react to genuine threats. But over time, authority over tariffs became lopsided. Primarily under President Ronald Reagan and then again under Trump 1.0, these laws have been used to impose tariffs with minimal (if any) justification and often without serious (or any) congressional consultation. The result? The president now wields near-unilateral control over a core aspect of economic policy that rightfully rests with Congress.

Trump has pushed this to its limits—and beyond.

During his first term, Trump used Section 232 to place tariffs on all steel and aluminum imports, citing national security. Economists, legislators, and defense officials questioned whether Canadian aluminum posed any real threat. He used Section 301 to target Chinese goods over intellectual property concerns. And in one of the most dramatic moves, he threatened to invoke the International Emergency Economic Powers Act —a law designed for wartime or genuine national emergencies—to impose tariffs on Mexico unless they curtailed immigration.

Trump 2.o has returned to that same playbook, only more aggressively. His rationale for sweeping tariffs centers on the long-running trope that trade deficits are synonymous with losing—a perspective that is politically appealing, but deeply flawed economically.

Economists of all stripes roundly reject framing trade deficits as losses. Mary Lovely, an economist with the Peterson Institute for International Economics, explained that idea plainly in a recent interview with NPR: “When I go to the grocery store, you know, I give them money. Are they ripping me off? No, I get groceries in return.”

Tariffs Aren’t Free

Trump’s “America First” pitch sells tariffs as cost-free nationalism. But the evidence tells a different story. When tariffs go up, it’s U.S. importers—and ultimately U.S. consumers—who foot the bill.

The Yale Budget Lab estimates that the new tariffs could cost U.S. households an average of $3,800 a year. Low-income families, who spend a higher share of their income on goods like clothing and electronics, will feel the pinch most acutely.

Retaliation is also a real and painful consequence. During Trump’s first term, the EU and countries like China and Canada responded with their own tariffs—many aimed at politically strategic industries in the U.S., such as agriculture. Farm bankruptcies spiked as a result, prompting the Trump administration to approve $28 billion in farm bailout payments.

Beyond the dollars and cents, there are foreign policy costs. Tariffs strain alliances, provoke trade wars, and make it harder to build coalitions on security and diplomacy. And this new round of tariffs will hit U.S. allies like Japan, South Korea, and Germany—at a moment when unity is needed more than ever on issues like China, Russia, and global supply chain resilience.

What Congress Can—and Must—Do

There’s a reason the founders put trade policy in Congress’s hands: It is complex, intensely consequential, and best handled by the branch of government designed to be slow and deliberate. Presidents, especially in an age of polarization, are prone to rash action and political point-scoring. Congress is supposed to weigh costs and benefits, hear from affected communities, and strike a balance.

Thankfully, some legislators are trying to restore Congress’s power. Senators Chuck Grassley (R., Iowa) and Maria Cantwell (D., Wash.) last month introduced the Trade Review Act, which would require congressional approval before the president could impose tariffs under Section 232. The bill would also require the Department of Defense—not just the president—to certify a genuine national security threat and mandate congressional approval of any proposed tariffs within 60 days.

In short, it restores oversight without removing flexibility.

The fact that a conservative like Grassley is leading this effort speaks volumes. This isn’t a partisan issue. It’s a constitutional one—and it’s gaining traction. At least six other Senate Republicans have voiced support of the bill. Rep. Don Bacon (R., Neb.) introduced similar legislation in the House this week.

However, Trump said he would veto such legislation if it were to cross his desk. It would take a two-thirds vote in both the House and the Senate to override a veto.

And yet, if Congress continues to sleep on this issue, it sets a precedent that trade policy should be a matter of presidential whim. But today’s whim could be tomorrow’s crisis. Trade touches every facet of American life—our jobs, our prices, our standing in the world. When tariffs are left to unilateral action, we risk not only economic volatility, but democratic erosion.

Tariffs are taxes. They demand public debate. And it’s time Congress reclaimed its voice in that debate.